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I.

INTRODUCTION

As divorce continues to trouble American society,' families increasingly turn
to courts to resolve their disputes. One controversy bringing families into the
courtroom concerns the right to relocate after divorce. 2 The issue has taken on
1. See, e.g., Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE LJ. 757, 757
(1985). The author states that "before they reach the age of eighteen, almost one-third of the
children in the United States will experience the divorce of their parents." Id.
2. See Spitzer, Moving and Storage of PostdivorceChildren: Relocation, the Constitution, and the Courts,
1985 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1, 2-3 (research shows divorced custodial parents relocate at a high rate within
four years of separation, and during that time seventy-five percent of custodial mothers move at
least once); see also Note, A Proposed "Best Interests" Tert for Removing a Child from the Jurisdiction of
the Noncustodial Parent, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 489, 495 (1982) (discussing New York trend that with
"increasing frequency, custodial parents wish to move with their children from the jurisdiction of
the noncustodial parent").
3. Folberg, Joint Custody Law - The Second Wave, 23 J. FAM. L. 1, 15-55 (1984); see ALASKA
STAT. SS 25.20.060, .090, .100 (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE SS 4600, 4600.5 (West Supp. 1986); COLO.
REv. STAT. SS 14-10-108, -123.5, -124, -131.5 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. SS 46b-56,
-66 (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, S 701 (1981); FLA. STAT. S 61.13(2Xb) (1985);
Act of Apr. 25, 1980, act 52, 1980 Hawaii Sess. Laws 63 (to be codified at HAwAI REv. STAT.
SS 571-46, -46.1); IDAHO CODE S 32-717B (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, S 602.1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. S 31-1-11.5-21() (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. SS 598.1,
.21, .41 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 60-1610(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1985); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. S 403.270(3) (Michie 1984); L.A. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 146 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, SS 214, 752 (Supp. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, S 31 (Michie/Law. Coop. Supp. 1986); MiCH. CoMp. LAws ANN. S 722.26a (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. SS
518.003, .17 (West Supp. 1986); MIss. CODE ANN. SS 93-5-23, -24 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT.
S 452.375 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. SS 40-4-223, -224 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
S 125.490 (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. S 458.17 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 40-4-9.1 (Supp.
1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 50-13.2(b) (1984); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. S 3109.04, .041 (Page Supp.
1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, S 21.1 (Supp. 1985); OR. REv. STAT. 55 107.095, .105 (Supp. 1983);
117
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new meaning with the adoption of joint custody statutes in thirty states. Joint
custody, or shared parental responsibility, 4 means that after divorce both parents
continue to play a meaningful role in the lives of their children. Parents share
decisionmaking responsibilities and maintain physical contact with their children. 6 To ensure continued access to both parents, courts often place geographical restrictions on ex-spouses.7 Thus, when a parent decides to relocate, that
parent must petition the court to have the restrictions lifted.8
For various reasons, custodial parents frequently wish to move out of the
jurisdiction, state, or country. 9 Parents often claim the move will result in better

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 5304 (Purdon Supp. 1986); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. S 14.06(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. S 767.24(1)(b) (West 1981). Professor Folberg suggests new post-

divorce family patterns and issues of gender equality are influencing courts to change the law in
this area. Folberg, supra, at 1.
4. The terms "joint custody" and "shared parental responsibility" are generally used interchangeably; Florida courts use the term "shared parental responsibility."
5. See generally Folberg, Custody Overview, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 3 (J.
Folberg ed. 1984). Folberg states:
The distinguishing feature ofjoint custody is that both parents retain legal responsibility
and authority for the care and control of the child, much as in an intact family. Joint
custody upon divorce is defined here as an arrangement in which both parents have equal
rights and responsibilities regarding major decisions and neither parent's rights are superior.
Joint custody basically means providing each parent with an equal voice in the children's
education, upbringing, religious training, nonemergency medical care, and general welfare.
The parent with whom the child is residing at the time must make immediate and dayto-day decisions regarding discipline, grooming, diet, activities, scheduling social contacts,
and emergency care.
Id. at 7.
6. See Foster & Freed, joint Custody Legislative Reform, TRIAL, June 1980, at 22 (joint custody
involves two concepts: (1) parents sharing legal responsibility and authority for decisionmaking in
important decisions affecting the child's life; and (2) sharing living time with the child with concomitant physical care).
7. See Folberg, supra note 3, at 8 (courts frequently restrict parental relocation with the
children in joint custody arrangements).
8. See, e.g., Costa v. Costa, 429 So. 2d 1249, 1250 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983) (custodial mother
petitioned for removal of geographical restriction to move children to Pennsylvania). Another important issue posed by geographical restrictions is a custodial parent's constitutional right to travel.
Although beyond the scope of this note, several commentators have analyzed the issue in the context
of removal suits. See Spitzer, supra note 2, at 11-14, 18-31; Note, Residential Restrictions on Custodial
Parents: Implicationsfor the Right to Travel, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 341 (1981); Comment, Restrictions on a
Parent's Right to Travel in Child Custody Cases: Possible Constitutional Questions, 6 U.C.D. L. REV. 181
(1973); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) ("[Tlhe nature of our Federal
Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free

to travel . . . uninhibited by statutes, rules or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict
this movement.").
9. See Spitzer, supra note 2, at 75. According to Professor Spitzer: "Most custodial parents
move for financial reasons, some to follow new careers themselves, others to follow the careers of
new spouses. Some move to more supportive communities where they have family or other connections. Some seek merely to leave uncomfortable living situations in old and unpleasant environments." Id.
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job opportunities,"' warmer climates," or educational benefits.' 2 Relocation,
however, often means the noncustodial parent no longer has access to the children. " The critical challenge in this area is to balance the rights of three groups:
children, custodial parents and noncustodial parents.' 4 As the courts become a
forum for distinguishing these rights and resolving disputes, guidelines are necessary for consistent decisionmaking."'
Courts throughout the nation have conflicting views on how to resolve these
issues.", Florida courts have adopted two standards for adjudicating relocation

10. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 124 Mich. App. 448, 335 N.W.2d 68 (1983) (court allowed move
where custodial mother claimed that her current husband had a higher paying job in another state
with greater opportunity for advancement, and that her career would develop better in the new
state).
11. See, e.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606 (1984) (custodial mother claimed
a move to California would provide a healthier climate for her children); Strahl v. Strahl, 66
A.D.2d 571, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184 (custodial mother argued that warm Florida climate would provide
additional recreational activities for her children and improve daughter's skin disease), aff'd, 49
N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184 (custodial mother claimed
the move to Florida would ensure superior educational advantages for her children), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d
1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1979).
13. See Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982). In Giachetti, the custodial
mother wanted to move her children from Florida to Alaska. The father argued that the move
would impair his rights of visitation. The court agreed with the father and prohibited the move.
Id. at 29. Giachetti has been criticized as posing an undue hardship on the custodial parent. See
Gersten, Parental Access and Residence Restrictions: Giachetti v. Giachetti, 56 FLA. B.J. 869, 870 (1982)
(stating Giachetti means that free access and liberal visitation granted in the custody decree implicitly
imposes a residential restriction on the custodial parent); Haines, Giachetti, Shared Parental Responsibility and the Constitution, 58 FLA. B.J. 235 (1984) (arguing opinions such as Ciachetti invade a

citizen's privacy, restrict the freedom of a custodial parent, and disregard the rights of children).
14. See infra text at S V.
15. See infra text at S VI.
16. See Bassett, Petition for Change of Domicile: Conflicting Standardsfrom the Appellate Courts, 62
MtcH. B.J. 423 (1983). Michigan has a conflict among appellate courts. "Where the Court of
Appeals fails to provide proper standards for use at the trial level, it is incumbent upon the Supreme
Court to step in and provide stability where it is now gravely lacking. Until that happens, the
change-of-domicile issue will remain in legal limbo." Id. at 426. Florida also has a conflict among
appellate courts. &e infra text accompanying notes 120-64. Standards for modification of residential
restrictions vary throughout the country. In Illinois, for example, to have a residential restriction
removed, the custodial parent has the burden of proof to show that a sensible reason exists for
the move and that the move is consistent with the child's best interests. In re Marriage of Burgham,
86 Ill.
App. 3d 341, 408 N.E.2d 37 (1980). In Iowa, the courts consider the reasons for the move,
location, distance, comparative advantages and disadvantages of the new environment, impact on
the children, and impact on the joint custodial and access rights of the other parent. In re Marriage
of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 159-60 (Iowa 1983); accord Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 574,
414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (moving parent must show exceptional circumstances before the residential
restriction will be lifted), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1979); Auge
v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399-400 (Minn. 1983) (the custodial parent may remove the child from
the state, unless the noncustodial parent establishes that removal would endanger the child's physical
or emotional health and is not in the child's best interests, or that the purpose of the move is to
interfere with visitation rights).
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controversies. 1 7 The majority approach requires the relocating spouse to show
both a substantial change in circumstances and that the move is in the best
interest of the child.' 8 Other Florida courts emphasize the importance of the
new family unit created after divorce, and allow former spouses to relocate
rather freely."' This minority approach allows the move if the relocating parent
can show some advantage to the family unit as a whole."' In the absence of
legislative or supreme court guidance, Florida courts will continue to conflict
2
in deciding these important relocation issues. '
This note examines the present status of residential restrictions in Florida
and when they should be modified. After a discussion of the psychological issues
involved, the note analyzes current approaches to the problem in New York,
New Jersey, and Florida. Based on criteria used in these jurisdictions, the note
suggests guidelines for Florida courts to follow in making decisions. This note
proposes that courts remove residential restrictions only if the advantages to
the child, the residential parent, and the new family unit outweigh the harm
to the child and the nonresidential parent. The proposed guidelines should
protect these three groups, curb judicial discretion, and encourage private settlement of disputes.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

At common law, residential restrictions on divorced parents were unnecessary. 22 Because husband and wife were considered one entity, the husband

received custody of the children when the marriage dissolved. 2' The nineteenth
century, however, brought significant changes in the status of women. 24 The
women's rights movement influenced the enactment of laws giving women the
right to own property and make contracts.

2

"

As women gained additional rights,

17. See infra notes 18 & 19.
18. E.g., Costa v. Costa, 429 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983). The Costa court stated
that a geographical restriction will not be lifted unless the custodial parent shows a material change
in circumstances and that the move is in the best interests of the children. Id. at 1253.
19. E.g., Matilla v. Matilla, 474 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985). The Matilla court endorsed
the view that the best interests of the new family unit must be considered in deciding whether the
move would be allowed. Id. at 307.
20. See id.; Simon v. Simon, 435 So.2d 941, 942 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
21. See Spitzer, supra note 2, at 74. Professor Spitzer argues the legal issue should be standardized not only because there are possible constitutional issues at stake, but also because the
problem is so widespread, and random results produce both unfairness and instability. Id.
22. A review of the early history of child custody determinations may be found in Roth,
7he Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423, 425-32 (1977), and in
Foster & Freed, Life With Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 325-29 (1978).
23. See Kapner, Joint Custody and Shared Parental Responsibility: An Examination of Approaches in
Wisconsin and in Florida, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 673, 679 (1983); see also Folberg, supra note 5, at 4
(in England the common law regarded children as their father's property, and the presumption
that the father was entitled to custody of his children was irrebuttable). The Florida Supreme Court,
in Busbee v. Weeks, 80 Fla. 323, 325, 85 So. 653, 653 (1920), stated: "At common law the father
has the paramount right to the custody and control of his legitimate minor children subject only
to the lawful regulations for the benefit of the children."
24. See Folberg, supra note 5, at 4.
25. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss1/4
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the preference for fathers in custody disputes gave way to a preference for
mothers.2 " This presumption, known as the "tender years" doctrine, held that
mothers should have custody of very young children.2 7 The doctrine reflected
an increased awareness of the special needs of children, although it assumed
28
that only women could meet those needs.
Courts soon recognized that custody determinations should be made according to the "best interests of the child. '2 9 The equal rights movement led
courts to acknowledge that fathers have the same rights as mothers in postdivorce situations."' This movement, combined with psychological studies showing the importance of both parents to the development of children,-" prompted
2
states to pass joint custody legislation.'
In Florida, the Dissolution of Marriage Act of 1971 - ' signaled a move toward
joint custody.' 4 This act substantially increased the father's right to custody and
visitation.", Courts soon conceded both husband and wife should be treated

26. Id. Folberg states that "society's acceptance of child developmental theories that viewed
children as evolving human beings led to placing a higher value on the importance of maternal
care, which undermined the paternal custody assumption." Id.
27. See Roth, supra note 22, at 423; see also Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1975)
(when all other things are equal, the mother of an infant of tender years should receive prime
consideration for custody of the child).
28. See WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, REPRESENTING THE PRIMARY CARETAKER PARENTS IN
CUSTODY DISPUTES 3 (1984).
29. See Behn v. Timmons, 345 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1977).
30. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the Supreme Court developed the doctrine
that laws classifying individuals on the basis of sex must be carefully scrutinized, and such laws
will not be upheld unless they are substantially related to an important governmental interest. Id.
at 75-76. Florida courts also recognize that fathers have significant rights to enjoy the custody of
their children. In Behn v. Timmons, 345 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977), the husband and
wife were divorced and the natural mother subsequently died. The father petitioned the court for
custody of his daughter, after she had been placed with her maternal grandparents. The court
held:
[A] parent has a natural God-given legal right to enjoy the custody, fellowship and companionship of his offspring. This is a rule older than the common law itself. And, except
in cases of clear, convincing, and compelling evidence to the contrary, a child's welfare
is preumed to be best served by care and custody by the natural parent.
Id. at 389 (citations omitted).
31. See Folberg, supra note 5, at 5. Although "early research [focusing] on child development
stressed the maternal role, recent research has emphasized the importance of the role that fathers
play in their children's development, as well as the importance of both parents being involved with
and available for the child." Id.; see also infra text at S III.
32. See Folberg, supra note 5, at 5.
33. FLA. STAT. SS 61.001-.20 (1985).
34. Prior to the Act, Florida courts uniformly permitted the custodial parent to relocate outside
the state with the children unless the final judgment specifically restricted residency. Gersten, supra
note 13, at 869; see, e.g., In re E.P., Jr., 186 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966); McCrillis v.
McCrillis, 147 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962); Bell v. Bell, 112 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1959).
35. Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406, 408 (3d D.C.A. 1976) ("[T]he Dissolution of
Marriage Act of 1971 . . . substantially increases a father's rights to custody and visitation."), cert.
denied, 342 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1977). In Scheiner, the court refused to allow the custodial mother to
move to California because the move would substantially change the visitation rights of the father.
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equally upon divorce." In continuing this trend, Florida statutorily recognized
the advantages of joint custody by enacting the Shared Parental Responsibility
Act in 1982.7 Florida Statutes section 61.13(2Xb)(2) states that courts shall
order shared parental responsibility unless it would be detrimental to the child. "
The statute declares that children must be assured frequent and continuing
contact with both parents after divorce.19 It also encourages parents to share
the rights and responsibilities of childrearing.* Therefore, both spouses retain
full parental rights, and major decisions affecting the child will be determined
4
jointly. '
III.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

To carry out legislative intent, Florida courts now presume that shared
36. See Kapner, supra note 23, at 682 (Dissolution of Marriage Act of 1971 drastically reformed
state divorce laws and provided for equal treatment of the sexes); see also FLA. STAT. S 61.08(1)
(1985) (alimony may be granted to either party); id. S 61.13(1)(a) (either spouse may be required
to pay child support).
37. Act of Apr. 5, 1982, ch. 82-96, 1982 Fla. Laws 233 (codified at FLA. STAT. SS 61.13(2)(b)
& .13(3) (1985)). The statute provides in pertinent part: "The court shall order that the parental
responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless it finds that shared parental
responsibility would be detrimental to the child. [Ifso] . . . it may order sole parental responsibility." FLA. STAT. S 61.13(2)(b)(2) (1985).
38. FLA. STAT. 5 61.13(2)(b)(2) (1985).
39. Id. S 61.13(2)(b)(1).
It is the public policy of this state to assure each minor child frequent and continuing
contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and
to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of childrearing. Upon considering all relevant factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as
the mother in determining custody without regard to the age of the child.
Id.
40. Id. S 61.13(2)(b)(2)(a). The Act states that "shared parental responsibility" means:
[B]oth parents retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to their child and
requires both parents to confer so that major decisions affecting the welfare of the child
will be determined jointly.... When it appears to the court to be in the best interests
of the child, the court may order or the parties may agree how any such responsibility
will be divided. Such areas of responsibility may include primary physical residence, education, medical and dental care, and any other responsibilities which the court finds unique
to a particular family and/or in the best interests of the child.
Id.
41. Although under shared parental responsibility both parents enjoy full parental rights and
responsibilities, courts are hesitant to order divided or split custody. Under divided custody, the
children would live with one parent for part of the year, then with the other parent for the remaining
portion of the year. When split custody is awarded, some children live with one parent while the
remaining children live with the other parent. See generally Folberg, supra note 5, at 6 (explicating
the differences among sole, split, divided, and joint custodies). Florida courts tend to make a
distinction between joint physical and joint legal custody. Under joint legal custody, both parents
continue to confer so that major decisions affecting the child's welfare are determined jointly. For
example, decisions concerning the education, religion, and health of the child are made together.
Instead of joint physical custody, also known as divided custody, courts designate one spouse as
the primary residential parent. That parent is responsible for the day-to-day decisions regarding
the child's welfare. See Frey v. Wagner, 433 So. 2d 60, 61 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983) (sharing parental
rights and responsibilities is presumptively in the best interests of children, and rotating the primary
physical residence of children remains presumptively not in their best interests).
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parenting is in the best interests of children.4 2 This presumption is supported
by psychological studies which suggest the importance to children of close and
continuing contact with both parents after divorce.' Residential restrictions often
ensure close contact with both parents. 4 Geographical proximity to the child
allows the nonresidential parent to continue to offer the love and support crucial
45
to the child's psychological well-being.
Researchers have found that children continue to have a strong interest in
maintaining a close relationship with both parents following a divorce.16 Close
contact with the nonresidential parent is important to a child because after
divorce the primary residential parent may become employed and have less
interaction with the child. 47 Furthermore, sporadic contact with the noncustodial
parent, usually the father, is inadequate for the emotional development supplied
by a healthy father-child relationship.48 A continuing, meaningful relationship
with both parents is critical to a child's successful adjustment to a divorce and
to his future development.4 9 Regular visitation by the noncustodial parent, therefore, is generally in the best interests of the child."' Circumstances that will
reduce such visitation are probably detrimental to the child."'
Joint custody offers children a greater opportunity to continue a close relationship with both parents.12 Although one parent usually has physical custody
of the child, shared responsibility allows children to view each parent as a full

42.

See Frey v. Wagner, 433 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983).

43.

See generally J.

WALLERSTEIN

&

J.

KELLY,

SURVIVING

THE

BREAKUP:

How CHILDREN AND

194, 307-11 (1980) (psychological well-being of a child is influenced
by continuing contact with both parents). Contra J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 38 (1973). The authors of this Freudian study conclude that
to protect the ongoing relationship between the custodial parent and the child, "the noncustodial
parent should have no legally enforceable right to visit the child, and the custodial parent should
have the right to decide whether it is desirable for the child to have such visits." Id.
44. See Costa v. Costa, 429 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
45. Id.
46. One long-term study of children of divorced parents found that children wanted increased
contact with the noncustodial parent, usually the father. "The intense longing for greater contact
persisted undiminished over many years." J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 43, at 134.
47. See Folberg, supra note 5, at 7.
48. See Lamb, Fathers and Child Development: An Integrative Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER
IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1, 30-32 (M. Lamb ed. 1981) (citing research); see also Cooper v. Cooper,
99 NJ. 42, 71-72, 491 A.2d 606, 621 (1984) (Schreiber, J., concurring). Professor Lamb cites
research which indicates the absence of one parent, usually the father, puts a child's social development "at risk." Lamb, supra, at 30-31.
49. See Machtlinger, The Father in Psychoanalytic Theory, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 113, 147 (M. Lamb ed. 1981) ("Psychoanalysts therefore consider the presence of
PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE

both parents to be essential for promoting healthy personality growth."); see also Cooper v. Cooper,

99 NJ. 42, 71, 491 A.2d 606, 621 (1984) (Schreiber, J., concurring). "Since children have to be
integrated into an extremely complex social system, the process of socialization itself must [be]
complex, flexible, and multifaceted. It should not be surprising that such a process demands the
complementary participation of several persons." Lamb, supra note 48, at 30.
50. See Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 71, 491 A.2d 606, 621 (1984) (Schreiber, J., concurring).
51.

Id.

52.

See Kapner, supra note 23, at 686.
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parent.5 Because joint custody promotes more frequent visits with the noncustodial parent, that parent must exercise complete parental care by providing
the child with meals, discipline, and friendship. 4 Thus, one parent does not
become the child's sole disciplinarian while the other parent becomes his vacation companion.5 ' One study concludes that shorter, more frequent visits,
such as weekend visits with the noncustodial parent, are more beneficial than
fewer, though longer, visits such as summer vacations. Courts view geograph7
ical restrictions as one means of making these frequent visits possible.5
Although a divorce is traumatic to children, a parent's absence following a
divorce often has a more serious impact."" Because ninety percent of nonresidential parents are fathers, most studies have focused on the effect of a father's
absence on a child's development.5' Researchers conclude fathers make a unique
contribution to children, especially in the formative years."" With regular visitation, a father can play an active role in shaping a child's behavior by offering
guidance, providing discipline, and acting as a role model. "'
One longitudinal study showed that children deprived of frequent access to
their fathers had diminished self-esteem, sometimes lasting as long as five years
after the divorce."' In contrast, children maintaining frequent contact with their
fathers adjusted positively and developed healthy social relationships.bI This condition was especially pronounced with boys. 64 Shared parental responsibility,
therefore, is likely to promote optimal psychological benefits to children."'
After a divorce, however, a child's relationship with both parents can never

53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.

56. R. GARDNER, PSYCHOTHERAPY WITH CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 379 (1976), cited in Cooper
v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 73, 491 A.2d 606, 621 (1984) (Schreiber, J., concurring).
57. E.g., Costa v. Costa, 429 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983); cf. McIntyre v.
McIntyre, 452 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1984). The McIntyre court stated:
It seems obvious that the practical demands of a mobile society in today's shrinking world
will at times collide head-on with the twin goals of maintaining a child's close relationships
with both parents, and preserving to the maximum extent possible the right of both parents
to retain full parental rights and responsibilities for the child.
Id. at 21.
58. See D. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 10 (1983).
59. Id.; see, e.g., P. ADAMS, J. MILNER & N. SCHREPT, FATHERLESS CHILDREN (1984).
60. See Hetherington, Children and Divorce, in PARENT-CHILD INTERACTION 33, 48-49 (R. Henderson ed. 1981) (without male and female parent figures, child has fewer positive characteristics
to mold); see also D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 58, at 10.
61. D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 58, at 10; see also Wallerstein & Kelly, Effects of Divorce on the
Visiting Father-Child Relationship, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1534 (1980).
62. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 43, at 248.
63. See Biller, The Father and Sex Role Development, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 319, 323 (M. Lamb ed. 1981) ("quality of fathering" is most important factor in
a boy's "positive development of his view of himself as a male"); see also Cooper v. Cooper, 99

N.J. 42, 72, 491 A.2d 606, 621 (1984) (Schreiber, J., concurring); D.
at 11.
64.
65.

SAPOSNEK,

supra note 58,

See Biller, supra note 63, at 323.
See Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 73-74, 491 A.2d 606, 622-23 (1984).
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be the same as when the family lived together. 66 Because the primary residential
parent has more contact with the child, that parent provides for special needs
on a daily basis.6 7 For example, this parent is responsible for cooking, caring
for the child in sickness, and making sure that homework is done.,, Thus,
courts must ensure that the residential parent has the opportunity to provide
69
for the child in the best possible way.

In the context of relocation controversies, courts should be sensitive to the
interests of both children and parents. Courts should consider the importance
of close contact with both parents to the psychological and emotional well-being
of children. 7" Because of the importance of the home parent to the child's
welfare, the special needs of the custodial parent must also be considered. 7' As
current methods of resolving these disputes indicate, courts are divided on how
to balance the competing interests of the children, the residential parent, and
the nonresidential parent. 72 A review of the current status of shared parental
responsibility in two leading jurisdictions will therefore provide a useful comparison with the doctrine's development in Florida.
IV.

A.

CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM

New York: "Exceptional Circumstances" Test

Although New York has no joint custody statute, it emphasizes the right
of noncustodial parents to have meaningful contact with their children. 7" New

66. Ste D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 205-06, 365 A.2d 27, 29-30 (Oh.
Div.), aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976).
67. See id.
63. See id.
69. Steid. at 207-08, 365 A.2d at 30. The court stated:
The custodial parent, who bears the essential burden and responsibility for the children,
is clearly entitled to the same option to seek a better life for herself and the children,
particularly where the exercise of that option appears to be truly advantageous to their
interests and provided that the paternal interest can continue to be accommodated, even
if by a different visitation arrangement than theretofore.
Id.
70. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
72. See infra text at § IV.
73. See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 174-75, 428 N.E.2d 377, 379-80, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862,
865 (1981). The New York Court of Appeals stated in Weiss that in custody arrangements, absent
exceptional circumstances such as those which would harm the child or when a parent has forfeited
his right to access, noncustodial parents should have visitation or other access as a matter of right.
Id. For the effect of a joint custody provision in New York, see Yeo v. Cornaire, 91 A.D.2d 1153,
458 N.Y.S.2d 743, aftd, 59 N.Y.2d 875, 453 N.E.2d 544, 466 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1983). In Yeo, the
custodial mother remarried and her new husband wanted to move to California to take advantage
of employment opportunities. The court prohibited the move because it would destroy any chance
the father had to maintain regular, substantial access to his child. The "emerging rule," according
to the court, is that "a geographic move will not be allowed to effectively deprive a parent of
regular access to a child. However, . . . each situation must be resolved on a case-by-case basis
...with special emphasis being placed on the best interests of the child and the stability of the
home environment." Id. at 1154, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 745 (citations omitted).
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York therefore requires a relocating spouse to demonstrate exceptional circumstances before allowing the move.14 In Weiss v. Weiss,7 5 the mother, who had

custody of an eleven-year-old son, wanted to remove the child from New York
to Las Vegas. 76 She claimed the move would allow her to make a new life for
herself by embarking on an unfulfilled singing career. 7 The New York Court
of Appeals held that the mother had not shown any exceptional circumstances
which would justify interference with the father's visitation rights.7 Emphasizing
psychological theory,7 9 the court reasoned the physical and emotional well-being
of a child depends on having access to both parents.80 The New York approach,
though strict, requires the relocating spouse to have extraordinary reasons for
the move before the court will sever the child's access to the noncustodial
parent."
One recent New York case intimated that absent compelling financial, educational, employment, or health considerations, a move that would curtail
regular visitation would not be allowed. In Daghir v.Daghir,8"2 a mother of three
wanted to move her children to France."" The move was necessary to accompany
her second husband, who had voluntarily accepted a two-year job assignment
in that country. 4 The mother claimed the move to France would give the
children a unique learning experience that would be in their best interests.""
The court held, however, that the benefits of frequent contact with the noncustodial father would outweigh the experience of overseas travel.,, The court
was influenced by the noncompulsory nature of the husband's move and the
frequent visitation by the children's natural father. 7 Had the move been mandatory, the court likely would have reached a different conclusion.,,

74.

See Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 174-75, 428 N.E.2d 377, 379-80, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862,

865 (1981).
75.
76.
77.
78.

52
Id.
Id.
Id.

N.Y.2d
at 172,
at 173,
at 175,

170,
418
418
418

418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981).
N.E.2d at 378, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
N.E.2d at 379, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865. The court stated: "[W]hile legal

custody may be in one or both of the parents, the fact that it is placed in one does not necessarily
terminate the role of the other as a psychological guardian and preceptor." Id., citing R.
supra note 56, at 381.
79. 52 N.Y.2d at 175, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865.

80.
81.

GARDNER,

Id.
See Note, supra note 2, at 514. Despite the strict standard, New York courts are sym-

pathetic to custodial parents whose moves are caused by the involuntary transfer of a second spouse.

See Cmaylo v. Cmaylo, 76 A.D.2d 898, 898-99, 429 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45, appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d
770 (1980). The Weiss opinion also suggests that remarriage, a firm job offer, or health reasons
may be accepted as exceptional circumstances. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 176-77, 418 N.E.2d at 381,
436 N.Y.S.2d at 866; see Spitzer, supra note 2, at 56.
82. 82 A.D.2d 191, 441 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 938, 439 N.E.2d 324, 453

N.Y.S.2d 609 (1982).
83.

Id. at 192, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 495.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 195, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
Id.
See id.at 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 497.

88.

See id.; see also supra note 81.
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The New York approach exemplifies many of the tensions inherent in relocation controversies. In Weiss, for example, the mother was forced to remain
in New York even though she felt she could make a better life for herself
elsewhere."" In Daghir, the mother was compelled to choose between accompanying her second husband to his new job locale, and thus forfeiting her
children to her previous husband, or remaining with her children in New York."
By requiring exceptional circumstances to justify a move, New York courts
often immobilize parents who are unhappy in their present locations."' As a
result of their parents' unhappiness, the children suffer as well. Because of their
daily contact, children are affected by the mental attitude of their parents. Thus,
'
allowing the move is often in the best interests of both the child and the parent.
The New York approach, while protecting the noncustodial parent's right of
access to the children, often overlooks the custodial parent's right to a new life
following divorce. Consequently, the best interests of the children are often
neglected.
B.

New Jersey: "Real Advantage" Test

In contrast to New York's exceptional circumstances test, New Jersey focuses
on the new family unit resulting from the divorce.9 ' Although New Jersey
prevents custodial parents from moving without consent of the other parent or
the court,"4 relocation is liberally allowed.95 Courts consider whether the move

89. See Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170 at 173, 418 N.E.2d at 379, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
90. See Daghir, 82 A.D.2d at 195, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
91. See Spitzer, supra note 2, at 75.
92. See D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 204-08, 365 A.2d 27, 29-30 (Ch.
Div.), aff'd per cudam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976).
93. See id. at 205-06, 365 A.2d at 29-30.
94. See N.J. STAT. ANN. S 9:2-2 (1960). In New Jersey, the custodial parent may not remove
minor children from the jurisdiction "without the consent of both parents, unless the court, upon
cause shown, shall otherwise order." Id. This anti-removal provision preserves "the mutual right
of the children and the noncustodial parent to develop and maintain their parental relationship
after custody has already been awarded to the other parent." D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J.
Super. 200, 204-05, 365 A.2d 27, 29 (Ch. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d
716 (App. Div. 1976).
95.

See Spitzer, supra note 2, at 35-36; e.g., Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220, 476

A.2d 828 (App. Div.) (where relocation would produce substantial advantages to custodial parent,
and child and noncustodial parent can maintain reasonably consistent relationship, no residency
restriction should be enforced), cert. denied, 99 N.J. 200, 491 A.2d 699 (1984). Minnesota parallels
New Jersey in allowing relocation rather liberally. See Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.
1983). The Auge court stated that removal may not be denied simply because the move may require
an adjustment in the existing pattern of visitation. A custodial parent is presumptively entitled to
remove his or her children from the state, unless the other parent shows that removal would
endanger the child's physical or emotional health, and is not in the child's best interests, or that
the purpose of the move is to interfere with visitation rights. Id. at 399. Recently, in Gordon v.
Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269 (Minn. 1983), the Minnesota Supreme Court extended the presumption
in favor of the custodial parent's removal decision to cases of joint custody. 339 N.W.2d at 271.
A strong dissent, however, recognized that the majority opinion erodes all significance of granting
both parents equal rights and responsibilities. Id. at 262 (Petersen, J., dissenting).
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will result in a real advantage and whether the move will harm the child.""
Perhaps the most influential relocation case is D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio."7 Taking
judicial notice of the new family unit with custody of the children, the court
stated that what is advantageous to the new family unit as a whole is also in
the best interests of the children."' When a custodial parent wants to relocate
to a distant location, the parent must demonstrate that the move will effect a
real advantage to the new family."' Once this benefit is shown, the court must
examine the following factors: first, the advantages of the move to both parent
and child in terms of its capacity for improving their general quality of life;
second, the motives for the move (i.e., whether the move was calculated to
defeat visitation rights); third, whether the parent will comply with future visitation orders; fourth, motives for challenging the move; and fifth, whether
adequate visitation will be available in the future.'
Using this analysis, the D'Onofrio court concluded the family would receive
a real advantage by moving out of state."" The mother showed that she had
a firm job offer in her trained field in South Carolina."" In addition, the
children would benefit by being near their grandparents and other close relatives. '"" Because the custodial parent is charged with the obligation to provide
the children's daily care, the court concluded she is entitled to seek a better
life for her family elsewhere." 4 Also, since the noncustodial parent is free to
move as he pleases, the custodial parent should be given similar rights."" Finally, the court argued that giving the noncustodial parent fewer, but longer,
uninterrupted visits would serve the parental relationship better than weekly
visits which involve little exercise of parental authority."',
In a recent case, New Jersey's Supreme Court reinforced the requirement

96. See, e.g., D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Ch. Div.), aff'd
per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976).
97. 144 NJ. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (Oh. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 144 N.J. Super. 352,
365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976). Other jurisdictions have adopted the D'Onofrio test. See, e.g., Hale
v. Hale, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 429 N.E.2d" 340 (1981); Henry v. Henry, 119 Mich. App. 319,
326 N.W.2d 497 (1982).
98. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at 206, 365 A.2d at 29-30.
The children, after the parents' divorce or separation, belong to a different family unit
than they did when the parents lived together. The new family unit consists only of the
children and the custodial parent, and what is advantageous to that unit as a whole, to
each of its members individually and to the way they relate to each other and function
together is obviously in the best interests of the children. It is in the context of what is
best for that family unit that the precise nature and terms of visitation and changes in

visitation by the noncustodial parent must be considered.
Id.
99.

Id. at 206-07, 365 A.2d at 30.

100.

Id.

101.

Id. at 211, 365 A.2d at 32.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

209-10, 365 A.2d
210, 365 A.2d at
206, 365 A.2d at
207, 365 A.2d at

at 31-32.
32.
30.
30.
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of showing a real advantage deriving from the move. Cooper v. Cooper"'7 offers
additional protection for the rights of the noncustodial parent. If a parent can
show that a proposed move would seriously hamper visitation rights, New Jersey
courts will require a compelling showing of advantage by the custodial parent
before allowing the relocation. ""
In Cooper, the custodial mother wanted to move with her two children across
the country to San Diego, California." '9 She claimed the move would provide
a healthier climate, business opportunities, and marriage prospects."" The father
offered compelling evidence that he could not visit his children frequently in
California."' The trial court order permitted the move, but the appellate court
reversed and imposed a further restriction on relocation."12 The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed and remanded to consider new information."' Although
the court approved of the D'Onofrio analysis, it stated the child's best interest
is not always coterminous with the parent's well-being." '4 Thus, a proper analysis involves consideration of the best interests of the child and both parents."'
Although New Jersey is considered lenient in allowing relocation,'16 the trend
there and in other states is that a move which will sever ties with the noncustodial parent will be strictly scrutinized.' 7 The Cooper opinion and concurrence emphasized social science literature that stressed the importance to children
of regular, frequent visitation with both parents."' Thus, when regular visitation
by the noncustodial parent will be curtailed, the move might not be in the best
interests of the children.""
C.

Florida: "Material Change in Circumstances"
and "Best Interests of the Child" Test

While New Jersey emphasizes the noncustodial parent's right of visitation,
Florida courts have traditionally stressed the children's right of access to their

107. 99 NJ. 42, 491 A.2d 606 (1984).
108. Id.at 58, 491 A.2d at 614.
109. Id.at 46, 491 A.2d at 608.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 48, 491 A.2d at 609.
112. Id.at 49, 491 A.2d at 609.
113. Id.
114. Id.at 54, 491 A.2d at 612.
115. Id. at 54-55, 491 A.2d at 612.
116. See Spitzer, supra note 2, at 35-36.
117. Cooper, 99 N.J. at 57-59, 491 A.2d at 614-15; accord In re Marriage of Burgham, 86 Il1.
App. 3d 341, 346, 408 N.E.2d 37, 40-41 (1980) (trial court must consider the visitation rights of
noncustodial spouse, and if removal would preclude reasonable visitation by that parent, relocation
should not be allowed).
118. Cooper, 99 N.J. at 53-54, 491 A.2d at 612 (opinion of court); id. at 69-74, 491 A.2d at

620-23 (Schreiber, J., concurring). The court stated that in most cases children of divorced parents
will have a better relationship with the noncustodial parent if there is continuing contact with that
parent. Id. at 54-55, 491 A.2d at 612, citing J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 43, at 30711 (suggesting that the psychological well-being of a child is influenced by continuing contact with
both parents); see also Cooper, 99 N.J. at 69-74, 491 A.2d at 620-23 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
119. See Cooper, 99 NJ. at 57-58, 491 A.2d at 614.
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parents. 12" Even prior to the enactment of Florida's shared parental responsibility
legislation, r12 courts held that children of divorced parents should have frequent
and meaningful contact with both parents.' 22 To carry out this policy, some
courts restricted the movement of children when it would interfere with visitation
rights.' 2- Residential restrictions would be lifted when the custodial parent showed
both a substantial and material change of circumstances, and that the move
24
would be in the best interests of the children.
In 1982, Florida enacted the Shared Parental Responsibility Act, 21' 5 which
ushered in a new era for relocation disputes. Courts have declared that even
if a final custody decree contains no explicit residential restriction, they may
imply a restriction when necessary to maintain continued access to both parents.' 26 Thus, primary residential parents must increasingly resort to the adversarial process to have restrictions lifted. Florida courts are hesitant to lift
restrictions unless the moving party can show the requisite material change in
circumstances and best interest of the child. 127 Recently, however, some Florida

120. See, e.g., Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982) (move to Alaska
would not be in the children's best interests because they would no longer have access to their
father); Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406 (3d D.C.A. 1976) (custodial mother may be enjoined
from moving to California when the move would sever the children's contact with the noncustodial
father), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1977).
121. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
122. See Foss v. Foss, 392 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981). The Foss court noted that courts
generally are allowed to restrict the movement of children of divorced parents. "The predicate for
the exercise of this power is a showing that the movement of the child may interfere with the
visitation rights accorded to the other party." Id. at 608. The court lifted a residential restriction
because the father made no showing that such a removal would be a threat to his visitation rights.
Id.; see also Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406 (3d D.C.A. 1976) (affirmed trial court's restraint
on mother's contemplated move across the country with children absent showing that children's
best interests would be served), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1977).
123. See, e.g., Viltz v. Viltz, 384 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. (1980) (mother permitted to
remove child from United States but required to allow daughter two months visitation with father
each year); Brandon v. Faulk, 326 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976) (move outside judicial circuit
denied because it would interfere with paternal grandparents' visitation rights).
124. See e.g., Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982); Jacobs v.
Ross, 304 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
125. Act of Apr. 5, 1982, ch. 82-96, 1982 Fla. Laws 233 (codified at FLA. STAT. SS 61.13(2)(b)
& .13(3) (1985)). For one judge's view of the effect of the new statute, see Kapner, Shared Parental
Responsibilities: Questions and Answers, 57 FLA. B.J. 163 (1983). Judge Kapner concludes it will be
harder for a primary residential parent to move out of the state under the new Act:
[Ulnder previous law, a custodial parent could not remove the children from the state
without a court order or permission of the other parent, if the move would defeat specific
or liberal visitation rights. Since the new law greatly expands the alternative parent's rights,
the primary parent would have a greater burden of proof to overcome.
Id. at 164.
126. Johnson v. Johnson, 455 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1984); Giachetti v. Giachetti,
416 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982).
127. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 452 So. 2d 14, 17 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1984) (stating unequivocably that the 1982 Act did not eliminate the requirement of a material change in circumstances);
Clinard v. Clinard, 478 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985); Adams v. Adams, 477 So. 2d 16 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1985); Warren v. Warren, 475 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985); Costa v. Costa,
429 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
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courts have taken judicial notice of D'Onofrio and similar opinions, and have
2
followed different standards in modification proceedings. ' Legislative or judicial
guidance, therefore, is needed immediately to resolve the conflict.
2
illustrates the mainstream approach in Florida. The trial
Costa v. Costa"'
court awarded the mother custody of her children, but restricted their removal
from Broward or Palm Beach counties.' "" The mother petitioned the court for
removal of the restriction when she decided to move to Pennsylvania, where
3
her new husband could seek a more lucrative job.' ' The children's father
demonstrated that he had faithfully visited his children since the divorce and
32
that he could not afford to visit Pennsylvania in the future.' Thus, the move
would effectively deny him access to his children.'"" Ruling the move was not
in the best interests of the children, the Fourth District Court of Appeal refused
to lift the restriction."Y14 Removal of the children to another state would only
'
exacerbate the children's trauma, according to the court." Regular visitation
with their father, on the other hand, would mitigate the harm caused by the
divorce.' "
Although the court in Costa would not allow a move to Pennsylvania, another
court, using the same analysis, concluded that a move out of the country was
permissible. In McIntyre v. McIntyre,"137 the mother petitioned for modification of
the custody decree to allow her to take her two children to Japan, where her
new husband was stationed in the navy. "' The original decree gave the mother
custody of the six-year-old daughter and the father custody of the nine-yearold son. "' The mother petitioned for custody of the son and removal of the
residence restriction. "" Claiming a substantial change in circumstances, the mother
4
emphasized that her new husband's job assignment mandated the move.' ' In
addition, the move would be in the children's best interests since they would
42
Even
benefit from the experience of travel and exposure to a foreign country.'
though the natural father would not have custody of his son and would no
longer have weekly contact with his children, the First District Court of Appeal
14
approved the move. 1

128. See Matilla v. Matilla, 474 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985) (adopting D'Onofrio analysis
and permitting custodial parent to move out of state); Simon v. Simon, 435 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1983) (adopting D'Onofrio analysis and allowing relocation).
129. 429 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
130. Id. at 1250.
131. Id. at 1250-51.
132. Id. at 1251.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1253.
135. Id. at 1251.
136. Id.
137. 452 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1984).
138. Id. at 16.
139. Id.

140.

Id.

141.
142.
143.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20-21. The court declined to state whether the shared parental responsibility pro-
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The court allowed the move because the mother had shown a substantial
change in circumstances.'44 Emphasizing the benefits of foreign travel and having
4
the family unit living together in Japan, the court sided with the mother.1 1
The alternative would have meant a separation of the children for two years . 4"
The court cautioned, however, that the mere fact of remarriage and improved
7
circumstances are not always sufficient grounds for modification of custody.1
Restrictions on relocation by a custodial parent may be necessary to preserve
parental rights.148 The controlling factors depend on the facts and circumstances
4

of each case.1' "

A strong dissent in McInyre argued the majority opinion destroyed the residential restriction of the final judgment and deprived the father of equal visitation rights.s" Furthermore, the decision avoided the intent of the shared
parental responsibility statute, which was enacted to increase a father's right
to custody and visitation. 15 When a custodial parent seeks to modify a residential restriction, the dissent argued, that party bears a heavy burden to justify
removal and the consequent impairment of the other parent's visitation rights.""
While Costa and Mcdntyre illustrate the majority approach, some Florida courts
have adopted the D'Onofrio test in deciding whether residential restrictions should
'
be lifted .","
For example, in Matilla v. Matilla, 54 the mother wanted to take her
daughter to Michigan in search of better employment opportunities.' Although
the mother had no firm job offer, the Third District Court of Appeal allowed
the move.', The court reasoned that after divorce, the children belong to a
new family unit. 5 7 Thus, in determining the best interests of the children, a
court must consider the best interests of the new family. 8 Here, the court held
the best interests of the family would be served by allowing the move because
the mother would have a better chance to provide for her children.'"
The dissent in Matilla approved of the D'Onofrio decision, but distinguished

visions reflected a legislative purpose to make it more or less difficult for a parent to change the
physical residence of a child to a place far removed from the residence of the other parent. Id.
144. Id. at 19.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 18.
147. Id. at 19 n.5, citing Sanders v. Sanders, 376 So. 2d 880 (Ist D.C.A. 1979), cert. denied,
388 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1980); Wiggens v. Wiggens, 411 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982); Stricklin
v. Stricklin, 383 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1980).
148. Mclntyre, 452 So. 2d at 20.
149. Id. at 21.
150. Id. at 22 (Zehmer, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 28 (Zehmer, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. See Matilla v. Matilla, 474 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985); Simon v. Simon, 435
So. 2d 941 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983); supra note 98.
154. 474 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 308.
157. Id., quoting D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super at 204-06, 365 A.2d at 29-30.
158. 474 So. 2d at 308.
159. Id.
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it from the instant case.", In D'Onofrio, the custodial mother who wanted to
move out of state showed that she had a firm job offer, lower rent, and the
support of an extended family in the new location."' In Matilla, the mother
showed no improved economic or environmental circumstances.' W The father,
who wanted to remain in Florida, showed an undiminished caring and loving
attitude toward his child, unlike the father in D'Onofrio.'"'*The shared parental
responsibility concept is destroyed, the dissent argued, where the primary residential parent can remove the child to another location by merely petitioning
4
the court with no other evidence than a desire to move."'
V.

ANALYSIS

Florida, like New York, has adopted a strict approach for modifying residential restrictions."'" In Costa, the court emphasized that it was protecting the
best interests of the children by preventing the move.'6 By immobilizing the
mother, her new husband, and the children, however, the court ignored the
needs of the new family unit.'"7 Had the court considered the possibility of
changing visitation schedules and adjusting the support award to allocate travel
expenses, the decision might have better protected the interests of children and
parents.""
The Costa and McInre decisions also illustrate the lack of certainty among
lower courts in Florida. Using the same standards, the two courts reached
dramatically different results. In Costa, the mother was not allowed to take her
children to Pennsylvania with her new husband.'" 9 In McIntyre, however, the
court allowed a move to a foreign country, depriving the father of equal visitation rights. 70
As the preceding cases indicate, the existing standards give Florida courts
unlimited discretion, governed only by the trial judge's personal views and
preferences.' 7 ' By encouraging judicial discretion, the Florida test provides an
added incentive to litigate.'7 2 In particular, nonresidential parents who are faced

160. Id. at 307 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
161. D'Onofsio, 144 N.J. Super. at 209-10, 365 A.2d at 31-32.
162. Matilla, 474 So. 2d at 308 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Spitzer, supra note 2, at 50.
166. Costa, 429 So. 2d at 1251.
167. Cf id. (discussion of facts limited to parents as individuals; no mention of remarried custodial
parent as member of new family unit).
168. See id. at 1254 (Anstead, J., dissenting). "[T]he courts should utilize other means, such
as increased summer visitation or a shift in the financial burden of visitation, to deal with the
problem and reserve the power to bar moves for the extreme case." Id.
169. Id. at 1251.
170. McInlyre, 452 So. 2d at 19.
171. See id. at 30-31 (Zehmer, J., dissenting); see also Note, The Judicial Role in Post-Divorce
Child Relocation Controversies, 35 STAN. L. REv. 949, 949-50 (1983) (arguing "judicial intervention
constitutes an unwarranted interference with both family autonomy and the custodial parent's freedom").
172. See Note, supra note 171, at 966-67 (limiting judicial discretion will encourage private
settlement of disputes).
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with the prospect of losing close contact with their children bring suits to prevent
the former spouse from relocating.' " Because judicial standards are vague, determining whether the residential parent has shown a material change in circumstances and whether the move would be in the best interests of the child
is difficult. 74' In some cases a substantial change in circumstances means a new
marriage,'5 in other cases, a new job. 7 6 The best interest standard also produces
results that are inequitable and uncertain. 77 According to some courts, exposure
to foreign culture is in the best interests of the child; '7 for others, travel to
another county in the same state would be contrary to the child's best interests.' 79 Consequently, neither party will be able to predict with any confidence
which changed circumstances will justify modification of residential restrictions. "'

In addition to excessive litigation, judicial discretion in custody disputes
creates a form of gender-based discrimination.'8 ' Although difficult to prove,

173. See Interview with Anne Spitzer, Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida College
of Law, Gainesville Sun, Jan. 17, 1986, at 6A, col. 3.
174. See Costa, 429 So. 2d at 1255 (Anstead, J., dissenting) ("[W]ho but the wisest among
us, except in the clearest of cases, could divine what may be in the best interests of the children?");
see also Price, "Best Interest" and "Material Change" Factors in Child Custody and Visitation Modification
Suits, 46 TEx. BJ. 1228 (1983).
175. See, e.g., McIntyre, 452 So. 2d at 19. The McIntyre court placed special emphasis on the
fact that the mother had remarried and was expecting a child. Id.
176. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 477 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985) (substantial change
in custodial mother's circumstances presented by her new job and new marriage).
177. See Note, Post-Divorce Visitation: A Study in the Deprivation of Rights, 27 DEPAUL L. REv.
113 (1977) ("best interests of the child" standard is abused because courts hide behind the phrase
and decide the case for other reasons); see also Comment, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child
Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 153-54 (1963) ("best interests" standard
"may be unworkable or a mere cloak for the operation of judicial intuition").
178. See, e.g., Cory v. Cory, 476 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985) (custodial mother allowed
to take son to Japan despite father's concern that the mother would not return the child to the
United States); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 452 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1984) (allowing custodial
mother to take her children to Japan, court emphasized the benefits to children from travel and
exposure to a foreign country); accord Jordan v. Jordan, 50 Md. App. 285, 439 A.2d 26 (1982)
(custodial mother allowed to take son to South Africa despite noncustodial parent's argument that
South Africa was a dangerous country).
179. See Carlson v. Carlson, 8 Kan. App. 2d 564, 661 P.2d 833 (1983). Contra Clinard v.
Clinard, 478 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985). In Clinard, the trial court placed a restriction on
the custodial mother from moving the child to another couity without the court's permission. The
Second District Court of Appeal, however, overturned the restriction. The court held that the
mother should not be restricted to just one county in Florida. Rather, she should be allowed to
reside within a close geographical area that would not substantially restrict the father's right to
visitation. Id. at 100. The court declined to define "close geographical area" and left that decision
for the trial court. See id.
180. See McIntyre, 452 So. 2d at 30 (Zehmer, J., dissenting).
181. See Spitzer, supra note 2, at 47.
One of the most pervasive hidden agendas [in relocation cases], and at the same time one
of the best hidden, is gender-based discrimination. The fact that the overwhelming majority
of custodial parents in the United States is female has undoubtedly skewed the results of
individual cases and the overall position of the law in relocation cases.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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such gender-based discrimination is encouraged by conclusory findings as to the
best interests of the child and a material change in circumstances.18 2 Furthermore, a disparate effect on women results when courts use residential restrictions
to immobilize the primary residential parent. Because ninety percent of custodial
parents in the United States are female, residential restrictions often discriminate
against women.' 8 Nonresidential parents, mostly men, are not immobilized
because courts rarely restrict them to a specific geographical area.1 8 4 If courts
were more sensitive to the needs of parents and the new family unit, discrimination in relocation proceedings might be alleviated.
The D'Onofrio analysis, adopted by the Third District Court of Appeal in
Matilla, has several advantages over the majority approach followed in Florida.
By requiring the relocating parent to demonstrate real advantages to the custodial family, the test ensures that children will not be removed on a whim or
for needless reasons. "" The test also curbs judicial discretion by promulgating
criteria for judges to consider.'8 6 This approach, however, limits the effectiveness
of shared parental responsibility. By focusing exclusively on the rights of the
custodial parent, the test ignores the countervailing rights and circumstances of
noncustodial parents. 187 In Florida, the legislature has declared that both parents
'
have equal rights and responsibilities in child rearing. 88
The test is also contrary
to psychological literature which reiterates the fact that children continue to
need two parents after the divorce."' J
Guidelines are necessary, therefore, to balance the interests of three different
groups. First, children have a right of access to both parents while growing
up."'' ' Second, primary residential parents have a right to foster new families
and provide for their children. ' 9' Third, nonresidential parents have a right to
meaningful and frequent contact with their children, and a responsibility to
take part in parenting. 92 Guidelines, then, should not only protect these three
182.

Id.

Whether relocation cases turn on a punitive motive of the court or on unarticulated
presumptions either as to the best interest of the child or the fitness of the custodial parent,
is usually impossible to determine. The probable existence of hidden agendas is evident,
but where they do exist they are easily covered over by conclusory findings as to the best
interest of the child, subjected to no more than rubber-stamp approval by appellate courts.
Id.; see also Note, supra note 171, at 964-65 (decisions regarding the "best interests of the child"
depend on value judgments made by the trier of fact which infringe on family autonomy and
exceed the limits of the court's competence).
183. See Spitzer, supra note 2, at 47; see also Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child
Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its Implicationsfor Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L.

REV.

539 (1982).
184. See Spitzer, supra note 2, at 47.
185. See D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at 206, 365 A.2d at 30.
186. See id.
187. See Matilla, 474 So. 2d at 308 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting).
188. See FL.. STAT. S 61.13(2)(b)(1) (1985).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 42-51.
190. See Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983); see also Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d
at 175, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
191. See D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at 207-08, 365 A.2d at 30.
192. See Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184 (holding that a parent may not
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groups, but also be specific enough to discourage judicial discretion and encourage private settlement of disputes. 193 Individuals should have an incentive
9
should
to settle their disputes out of court. 19 4 When this fails, mediation""
provide a viable alternative to the adversary process.19
VI.

PROPOSED GUIDELINES

The following guidelines should ameliorate many of the problems inherent
in present relocation decisions. First, if joint custody is not awarded, no geographical restrictions should be placed on the custodial parent. 97 In Florida,
joint custody is not awarded when it would be detrimental to the child. 9" Thus,
courts should allow custodial parents to relocate as they wish because shared
parenting would not be in the best interests of the child. If, however, the
noncustodial parent were given liberal visitation rights, courts should scrutinize
moves by the custodial parent to ensure that good reasons exist for the move.,""
If the primary residential parent seeks to have residential restrictions removed, the court should balance the rights of the child, the residential parent,

be deprived of his or her right to reasonable and meaningful access to the children by the marriage
absent exceptional circumstances), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635
(1979). Federal courts have even created new causes of action for nonresidential parents deprived
of access to their children. See Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985). In Raftery, the
Fourth Circuit held that a mother is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress where she
destroyed the father-son relationship between her ex-husband and their child. Id. at 339.
193. See Note, supra note 171, at 966-67 ("[Jludicial discretion discourages the parties from
reaching prior agreements between themselves since these agreements will not necessarily be enforced.").
194. See Gersten, supra note 13, at 871. The author's solution to the problem is the out of
court adoption of a custodial plan: "If divorcing parties are capable of prospectively devising a
plan which provides acceptable visitation alternatives in the event of an anticipated or unanticipated
move of the residential parent, a great volume of unnecessary and traumatic litigation could be
avoided." Id.
195. "Mediation" can be defined as a process by which the parties, with the help of a neutral
person, systematically isolate points of agreement and disagreement, explore alternatives, and consider compromises to reach an agreeable settlement. See Folberg, Divorce Mediation: Promises and
Pitfalls, 4 FAM. ADvocATE 4 (1983). For an in-depth analysis of the issue, see J. HAYNES, DIvoRcE
MEDIATION 29-43 (1981); D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 58; Pearson & Thoennes, Mfediating and Litigating
Custody Disputes: A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAm. L.Q. 497 (1984); Philbrick, Agreements to Arbitrate
Post-Divorc Custody Disputes, 18 COLuM J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 419 (1985); Zumeta, Mediation as an
Alternative to Litigation in Divorce, 62 MIcH. B.J. 434 (1983).
196. See Jones v. Bowman, 479 So. 2d 772, 772 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985) (Glickstein, J.,
concurring). Judge Glickstein stated: "[T]here are surely more humane and sensitive ways to
determine the future of a child than by combat." Id. He cited with approval a report recommending
mediation as the first step in any proceeding which involves custody, visitation, or child support.
Id. at 772-73, citing FLORIDA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CHILD SUPPORT, FINAL REPORT (1985). For
an authoritative analysis of the issue, see D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 58, at 1-22, 238-43.
197. See McIntyre, 452 So. 2d at 20 ("[T]here is no restriction on change of residence by a
custodial parent unless such a restriction is contained in the final judgment of dissolution .....
198. FLA. STAT. S 61.13(2)(b)(2) (1985).
199. See Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406, 408 (3d D.C.A. 1976) (where a projected
change in residence will substantially alter a parent's visitation rights, the trial court should issue
an order protecting the best interests of the children), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1977).
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and the nonresidential parent. In ascertaining the child's best interests, the trial
court should take into account the following factors. First, the court should
cunsider the length of time the child has lived in a secure home environment,
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.2"" Second, findings of child psychologists should be examined.2 '0 Courts should consider how the move might
affect the emotional, physical, or developmental needs of the child.2"2 Third,
the home, school, and community record of the child should be considered.2" 3
Fourth, the reasonable preference of the child should be taken into account if
the child is mature enough to make a considered decision about the move.2"
The child's preference, however, should not be a controlling factor.2"5 Fifth,
courts should consider the likelihood of frequent visitation in the new locale.
Next, the court should determine the primary residential parent's best interests, taking into account the following factors. First, the court should scrutinize the advantages of the move in terms of educational opportunities, financial
improvements, or health requirements.2 6 Second, if the move was caused by
a mandatory job transfer of the custodial parent or a new spouse, courts should
be sympathetic to the relocation request.2" 7 Third, the court should ascertain
whether the relocating parent has actual job prospects in another location.2"8
Fourth, the court should determine whether the parent has shown that satisfactory employment could not be obtained in the present location.2 "9 Fifth, the
parent's motives in proposing the move should be analyzed.21" If the move was
proposed to defeat the joint custody arrangement, the court should not allow
the move.21' Sixth, having relatives present in the new location should weigh
in favor of the relocating spouse. 2 2 Seventh, the court should consider the
200.

See FLA.

STAT.

S 61.13(3Xd) (1985) (factors in determining the best interests of the child

for purposes of shared parental responsibility).
201. See supra text at S III.
202.

See supra notes 4849 and accompanying text.

203. See FLA.

STAT.

S 61.13(3)(h) (1985).

204. See id. S 61.13(3)(i); see also Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 578, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184,
188 ("(W]hile ... children's attitudes should be given consideration, their wishes are not nec-

essarily determinative."), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1979); Gersten, Demonstrating Preference: The Child as Witness in a Custody Dispute, 60 FLA. B.J. 60 (1986). Gersten
states that courts should use a three-step analysis in considering a child's preference for primary
residential parent: (1) the court must determine that the child has sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference; (2) the court must then select the best method
to ascertain that preference while protecting the child's best interest; and (3) the court must decide

how much weight to give such a preference. Id. at 60.
205. See Garvey v. Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980) ("Although the
preference of a child is one factor to be considered, it cannot control the disposition of custody.").
206. See D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at 206, 365 A.2d at 27; Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 176, 418

N.E.2d at 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
207. Cf Daghir, 82 A.D.2d at 196, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 497 (where new husband's job change
was strictly voluntary and without financial reason, court denied custodial mother permission to

remove children to France to accompany new husband).
208.

See Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 177, 418 N.E.2d at 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 866.

209. See id.
210. See D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at 206, 365 A.2d at 30.
211. See id.
212.

See id. at 210, 365 A.2d at 32.
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advantages to the family unit as a whole. 213 For example, if the spouse has
remarried and has additional children, the court should place special emphasis
21 4
on the advantages to the new family unit.
Finally, the court should evaluate the nonresidential parent's best interests,
taking into account the following factors. First, the court should determine
whether the parent will be able to share parental responsibilities after the move."
Second, the impairment of parent's visitation rights must be considered. 1 6 Third,
the motives of the parent in opposing the move should be analyzed." 7 Fourth,
the extent to which the nonresidential parent presently shares parental rights
and responsibilities should be an important factor. 218 If the parent neglects to
exercise his rights, i.e., visiting, caring for, and loving his children, the re219
striction should be lifted.
After making specific findings of fact, courts should remove residential restrictions only if the advantages to the child, the residential parent and the new
family unit outweigh the harm to the child and the nonresidential parent. If
a nonresidential parent will lose substantial rights and responsibilities of shared
parenting, the courts should require a compelling showing of advantage by the
residential parent before allowing the move. 22 This test guarantees that the
parent has legitimate reasons for moving, that the child will benefit from the
move, and that the nonresidential parent will be harmed only for justifiable
reasons.
Such guidelines would allow the trial court to make a thorough conclusion
regarding the proposed move. Conclusory findings as to a material change in
circumstances and the best interests of the child would be replaced by evidentiary
findings based on a complete evaluation of the situation. Furthermore, neutral
third parties, such as lawyers or mediators, could evaluate the factors in a nonadversarial setting and arrive at a result based on the parents' mutual agreement.2 2 1 For example, if legitimate reasons for the move existed, such as im213.
214.
215.

See id. at 206, 365 A.2d at 30.
See McIntyre, 452 So. 2d at 19.
See Fishbein, Visitation Rights: Providing Adequate Protectionfor the Noncustodial Parent, 3

CAR-

DOZO L. REV. 431, 436-40 (1982).

216. See id. at 435-40; see also Costa, 429 So. 2d at 1251.
217. See D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. at 206-07, 365 A.2d at 30.
218. See Cooper, 99 N.J. at 57-58, 491 A.2d at 614.
219. Cf. Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 577, 414 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187, aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036,
407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1979).
In determining whether a parent's privilege to associate with the children of the marriage

should be either diminished or discontinued, a trial court should not penalize the parent
because he or she has not taken full advantage of visitation rights previously granted. The
test is not perfection, but, rather, whether . . . such parent has demonstrated both a sincere
desire to be in the company of the children and has had a close, continuous and meaningful
association with them over a significant period of time.
Id.
220. See Cooper, 99 NJ. Super. at 58, 491 A.2d at 614 ("If it is shown that a noncustodial
parent's visitation would be adversely changed or curtailed by the move, the court should require
a very substantial or compelling showing of advantage by the custodial parent before allowing the
move.").
221.

See Shepard, Philbrick & Rabino, Ground Rules for Custody Mediation and Modification, 48

ALB. L. REv. 616 (1984).
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proved employment with a firm job offer or a mandatory job transfer, the
mediator could facilitate an agreement. 22 2 If, however, there were no valid reasons for moving, or if the reason were to destroy the visitation rights of the
other parent, then the mediator could warn the parent of the legal and psychological consequences of such a move. 223 Moreover, by advising both parents
of these consequences as well as the likely results of litigation, the mediator
could dissuade geographical moves based upon faulty reasons.2 24 Thus, if both
parents respect each other's importance to their child, they can make shared
2
parental responsibility work without the intervention of the court .1 5
VII.

CONCLUSION

The present approach to resolving residence restriction controversies is confusing and conflicting. The proposed guidelines would bring some stability to
post-divorce situations. In the long run, however, courts must encourage families
to make decisions regarding their lives out of court." ' Through individual negotiation or mediation, parents should decide the family's best interests.2 2 7 By
knowing what standards the courts will apply, individuals will be encouraged
to settle out of court.122 If shared parental responsibility is to be given meaning
in this state, parents must be willing to make sacrifices for their children and
their former spouses.2 29 When spouses are willing to make such sacrifices, the
child's best interests will almost always be protected. When that approach fails,
courts must decide such cases with specific guidelines.
PAUL S. QUINN, JR.

222.
223.

See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 58, at 241.
Id. at 241-42.

224. Id. at 242.
225. Id.; see also Goldenberg, The Shared Parental Responsibility Act: How to Provide for the Best
Interests of a Child, 59 FLA. B.J. 59, 59-63 (1985).
226. See Jones v. Bowman, 479 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985).
227. See Note, supra note 171, at 964.
[Tihc judiciary should not be allowed to represent the child's best interests in relocation
cases because such representation infringes on family autonomy ....
Courts lack both
the competence and the legitimacy to determine what is in the best interests of the child.

Id.
228. Id.
229. See Daghir, 82 A.D.2d at 194-95, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 496:
The decision to bear children, however, entails serious obligations and among them is the
duty to protect the child's relationship with both parents even in the event of a divorce.
Hence, a custodial parent may be properly called upon to make certain sacrifices to ensure
the right of the child to the benefits of visitation with the noncustodial parent.
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